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Abstract
This study investigates asymmetric auctions with resale using controlled laboratory
experiments. In the first essay titled “Auctions with Resale: An Experimental
Study”, we study the bidding behavior in first price asymmetric auctions followed
by resale markets wherein bargaining power varies from seller to buyer. Building
upon current literature, we posit a revenue-efficiency trade-off between the resale
regimes with either the seller (Monopoly resale) or the buyer (Monopsony resale)
has all bargaining power. The results imply a symmetrization of bids for both the
bidders under both regimes. Using controlled experiments that mimic the theoretical
setting, we find support for higher bidding under the monopoly resale regime with
similar efficiency levels across the two resale regimes. Then we employ quantile
regression analysis by controlling for certain bidder specific and auction specific
characteristics to provide limited evidence for symmetrization.
The second essay, “Bargaining in Auctions with Resale”, extends the analysis
to a double auction (DA) framework in the resale stage that gives both, buyer and
seller equal bargaining power. The theoretical results indicate that the equilibrium
bidding functions and the resale prices under the DA regime fall in between those
from the monopoly and monopsony regimes and the bid-symmetrization property
continues to hold in this case as earlier. After running experiments similar to earlier
setup, we do not find much support for symmetrization. However, there is limited
evidence for a transition of average bids and resale prices across regimes.
The final essay, “Emission Trading Schemes as Auctions with Resale”, reviews
emission trading schemes (ETS) as auctions with resale and examines the results
from RGGI (Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, an ongoing ETS in the United
States) in the light of previous analysis. The trend of RGGI allowance prices indi-




Auctions are among the oldest institutions governing economic transactions. The
principal aim of any general auction procedure is to award a commodity to the bidder
who values it the most. Traditionally, auctions have been used to sell antiques and
collectibles. Use of auctions in the sales of government debt by central banks as
well as in government procurement contracts is seen as a routine practice. The
scope of objects sold via auctions has been expanding over the years. Today it
ranges from something as abstract as an electromagnetic spectrum or a right to
emit certain pollutants to professional players in an international cricket league1.
This ever-widening scope and volume of transactions under auctions coupled with
numerous and varied procedures in which they are carried out, have made them an
exciting subject of inquiry. One such interesting but relatively less studied aspect
is the presence of a resale opportunity and how it affects the bidding behavior in an
auction. Most of the standard results in auction theory take the absence of resale
following an auction for granted. However, we do see objects being resold after an
auction on a number of occasions, even at times when resale is prohibited.
For instance, the 3G spectrum license auctions in UK generated a record revenue
of over £22 billion (about $35 billion) for the 5 licenses2 offered for sale in the
year 2000. Although the resale of the licenses was prohibited by the government,
telecommunication companies found ways to circumvent this restriction. TIW, a
US-Canadian firm that acquired the most prized license ‘A’ for over £4.38 billion,
was initially backed (and eventually purchased) by a Hong Kong conglomerate,
Hutchison Whampoa, whose core businesses include telecommunications. Further,
1Professional cricket players are auctioned off to various teams in the Indian Premier




when NTL - a cable company backed by France Telecom dropped out of the auction,
it didn’t stop France Telecom from acquiring Orange Telecom, who won license ‘E’
for about £4 billion at the auction. Another successful bidder, British Telecom, won
license ‘C’ through a wholly owned subsidiary and floated it on the stock market
to sell. This example clearly shows the ability of firms to anticipate post-auction
resale and (in this case) bid higher to claim the resulting common surplus.
Another potential application of auctions with resale can be found in the elec-
tricity markets. The deregulation of electricity industry has resulted in separating
the activities of generation, transmission and distribution of electricity, tradition-
ally done by a monolith firm. Subsequently, this separation of activities led to the
creation of wholesale and retail markets for electricity. The players in wholesale
market include generators, retailers as well as other financial intermediaries who
specialize in transmission and distribution only. Many of the established wholesale
power markets today in the US (PJM, New England, ERCOT3) employ auctions to
sell electricity wherein some of the participants are retailers who bid only for the
sake of resale to end-users.
Despite their growing importance, auctions with resale have received attention
very recently in terms of theoretical and empirical literature. Bikhchandani and
Huang (1989) formulated the market of US Treasury Bills (TB) as auctions with
resale and compared expected revenues from having primary market as a discrim-
inatory auction versus a uniform price auction. They derived sufficient conditions
under which the expected revenues are higher for the uniform price auctions. In a
related study, Hortascu and Kastl (2008) examined the effects of information gain
about rival bids on the bidding behavior using data from Canadian Treasury Bill
auctions. They consider whether bid updating by a dealer (third party bidder)
differs on the basis of a private value component or the common value one. Since
3Please see http://www.ferc.gov/market-oversight/mkt-electric/overview.asp.
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there are no resale considerations involved in a private value setting, the updating
is restricted to the distribution of residual supply. On the other hand, information
about rival bids leads to updating the value of the object itself under a common
value setting. The empirical results indicate that the auction data from 3-months
T-Bill market support the private values model (implying lesser resale considera-
tions) whereas the data from 12-months T-Bill market fail to support the private
values model (implying higher resale considerations).
In a series of theoretical papers (1999, 2000, 2003), Haile established that a resale
opportunity adds a common value element to an otherwise private value auction.
Haile (2001) provided empirical evidence for the effect of a resale market on bidder’s
willingness to pay in a study of auctions of timber contracts by the US Forest Service.
He used a policy change that restricted resale to find bidder valuations of timber
contracts to be higher before the policy change. For a large class of items (e.g.
antiques, wines, books, paintings, confiscated automobiles, real estate etc.) sold in
auctions, a majority of the participants are the ‘dealers’, who specialize in reselling
the items won during those auctions. Market for real estate (especially, in the light
of recent property bubble in US) can be thought of as providing ample opportunities
to these dealers/middlemen to profit from resale. Bose and Deltas (2007) examined
the role of such a ‘middleman’, someone with no use value participating in an
auction with resale. They find that the presence of middleman can prevent bidders
with higher valuation from entering initial auction. Similarly, Garatt and Troger
(2006) specify a ‘speculator’, who can limit the access to bidders if active in primary
auctions followed by resale.
Asymmetry among bidders can more than often be cited as a reason for post-
auction resale. Asymmetries can occur on account different dimensions - information
advantage, market size, experience etc. Pagnozzi (2007) considered English auctions
with resale involving a weak-strong pair of bidders where the bidders’ values are
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distributed asymmetrically. He finds that the prospect of resale leads to relatively
aggressive bidding by the weak type bidder, and thus higher revenue for the initial
seller. Further, it is shown that a strong type bidder may be better off by letting
the weak bidder win the initial auction at a relatively low price and purchasing the
item in the resale market.
There have been very few experimental studies (List, 2004; Georganas and Kagel,
2011; Georganas, 2011) that focus on auctions with resale opportunities. Their
major focus has been on comparing bidding behavior between resale and no-resale
scenarios to understand the effect of resale on auctions. As theoretical literature
establishes links (See, Cheng and Tan, 2008; Lebrun, 2010) between different types
of resale market structures and its impact on bidding behavior, there is a need to
verify those results using experimental setting. This study seeks to fill this gap.
The purpose of this study is to investigate the effects of bargaining power in
the resale stage on the bidding behavior in the first stage of auctions. This study
builds upon recent theoretical advances4 in the literature and provides experimental
results that could be helpful in understanding the workings of real-world markets
such as markets of CO2 allowances.
In the first essay titled “Auctions with Resale5: An Experimental Study”, we
analyze the bidding behavior in first price asymmetric auctions followed by resale
markets, wherein bargaining power lies entirely either with the seller or the buyer.
We extend the theoretical results of Hafalir and Krishna (2008) to a setting where
the buyer has all the bargaining power (called as a monopsony resale regime) and
find that the bidders will bid lower compared to the case where the seller has all
the bargaining power (termed as a monopoly resale regime). Further, we also find
that the efficiency (in the sense of the object ending up with the party valuing
it the most) is higher under the monopsony regime. Finally, the results indicate
4Hafalir and Krishna (2008), Cheng and Tan (2008)
5This chapter is based on a paper written jointly with Georgia Kosmopoulou.
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equivalence of bid distributions for the bidders, i.e., both the bidders bidding in
identical manner (bid-symmetrization) in equilibrium under both regimes. Using
controlled experiments that mimic the theoretical setting, we find support for higher
bidding under the monopoly resale regime with similar efficiency levels across the
two resale regimes. Then we employ quantile regression approach by controlling
for certain bidder specific and auction specific characteristics to provide limited
evidence for symmetrization under the monopsony resale.
The second essay, “Bargaining in Auctions with Resale”, extends our investiga-
tion to include a double auction (DA) framework in the resale stage. i.e. both, buyer
and seller in the resale stage can make offers and the trade ensues if buyer’s offer is
higher than or equal to the seller’s offer. The trading price in this case equals the
average of the two offers. Our theoretical results indicate that the equilibrium bid-
ding functions and the resale prices under the DA regime fall in between those from
the monopoly and monopsony regimes. The symmetrization property continues to
hold in this case as earlier. Our experimental results indicate that the average bids
and prices under the DA are found to be closer in magnitude to the ones under the
monopsony regime. We analyze the bidding by different bidder-specific characteris-
tics such as gender, risk attitude, major and previous participation but do not find
evidence for symmetrization.
In the final essay, “Emission Trading Schemes as Auctions with Resale”, we
review emission trading schemes (ETS) as auctions with resale and focus on one
of the real world ETS, Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) that came into
effect from January 2009. We discuss how the structure of an ETS fits in the
framework of auctions with resale by describing the primary and secondary markets
followed by an analysis of the allowance auction results held in the first phase of
RGGI. The behavior of clearing prices for the auctions held in the RGGI indicates
a shift from a seller’s market to a buyer’s market over the course of three years.
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Chapter 2
Auctions with Resale: An Experimental Study
2.1 Introduction
This chapter1 compares bidding behavior across first price asymmetric private value
auctions with resale opportunities presented in seller’s and buyer’s markets and
offers experimental evidence on bidding behavior and resource allocation.
Standard results in auction theory presume mostly the absence of resale options.
However, forward looking bidders, having a chance to resell in a secondary market,
bid differently than bidders in a single auction setting. In fact, the sale prices of
government owned assets or public resources are often determined by resale op-
portunities. Examples include spectrum license auctions and the ensuing sale of
telecommunication companies in the last decade and, more recently, sales of right
to emit pollutants, especially greenhouse gases. The structure of a secondary mar-
ket for emission permits, for instance, can have a significant effect on initial bidding
behavior in established Emission Trading Schemes (ETSs or cap and trade schemes)
and how they impact initial as well as final allocative efficiency. The applicability
of this framework extends to housing markets, real estate sales and (re-)allocation
of common pool or common property resources. Examples include fisheries, wildlife
preserves and surface water resources (White, 2006).
When the option to resell in a secondary market exists, bidders take this option
into account and adjust their bids in the primary auction market. Adding a resale
opportunity introduces a common value element to an otherwise private value auc-
tion (Haile, 1999). If the winner of an auction has all the bargaining power in the
resale market (in what we call a monopoly resale regime), there will be a speculative
interest in acquiring the item at the auction stage knowing there is a chance to resell
1This chapter is based on a coauthored paper with Georgia Kosmopoulou.
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it (Hafalir and Krishna, 2008). On the other hand, if the loser of the auction has
all the bargaining power in the resale market (in a monopsony resale regime), such
an interest does not exist and the common value at the auction stage is restricted.
Thus we expect more aggressive bidding in a monopoly resale regime than in a
monopsony resale regime. In both cases, the common value created by the resale
opportunity leads to a symmetrization of bids; in equilibrium, bidders behave as if
they compete in a symmetric auction for a common value whose size is determined
by the structure of the resale market. Both first stage bids and resale prices are
expected to be higher under the monopoly resale regime leading to greater efficiency
losses.
In this chapter, we investigate the relationship between revenue and efficiency
using controlled experiments that mimic the theory. We consider an initial auction
taking place between two bidders drawing their values from asymmetric supports.
We find higher bids on average in a monopoly resale regime than in a monopsony
resale regime. Interim efficiency, measured in terms of the proportion of efficient
outcomes realized at the conclusion of the auction stage, is the same across regimes
but higher in magnitude than predicted. Final efficiency becomes higher for the
monopsony resale regime when bidder asymmetries are more pronounced. In the
monopoly resale regime, large asymmetries in the value distributions across bidders
lead to statistically significant differences in the bid distributions, which is consistent
with other experimental work (see Georganas and Kagel 2011). In the monopsony
resale regime, however, controlling for bidder and auction heterogeneity, we provide
some evidence in support of bid symmetrization for values in the middle range.
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows. The next subsection reviews
related literature. Section 2.2 presents the theoretical framework followed by equi-
librium bid and (ex-ante) efficiency predictions. Section 2.3 describes the experi-
mental design. Section 2.4 presents the main results and related discussion. The
7
final section offers concluding remarks.
2.1.1 Related Literature and Motivation
Haile’s (1999) theoretical paper is among the earliest to analyze auctions with resale
as a two stage game. Using the first price, second price and English auction settings,
he shows that valuations are determined endogenously when forward looking bidders
take into account the possibility of resale in a secondary market. The resale market
structure determines the size of common surplus to be extracted in an initial auction.
Hence, the revenue at the auction stage depends on the resale market structure and
the information linkage between primary and secondary markets.
Haile (2001) tests empirically this result using data on U.S. Forest Service tim-
ber sales. Using a structural empirical model and taking into account unobserved
heterogeneity and bids by opponents, he finds evidence that bids are higher with a
‘high’ resale seller effect (high likelihood of selling in a resale market) and a ‘low’
resale buyer effect (low likelihood of purchasing in a resale market).
Haile (2003) extends these ideas in a theoretical paper that emphasizes this
informational linkage between markets. He constructs a two stage game, using
three auction formats (first price, second price and English auctions) in the first
stage and two auction formats (optimal and English) in the second stage to show
the effect of a resale market on equilibrium bidding strategies.
More recently, Hafalir and Krishna (2008, 2009) and Cheng and Tan (2008) have
studied market efficiency and revenue generation in independent private value (IPV)
auctions with resale. These papers consider two types of bidders with asymmetric
value distributions. Hafalir and Krishna focused on the revenue ranking between
first and second price auctions with resale. One of the major insights from this
work is the symmetrization property. Given the resale market structure, for every
first price asymmetric auction there is an equivalent first price symmetric auction.
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Asymmetric bidders behave as if they are competing in a symmetric auction for a
common surplus determined by the nature of resale competition. In equilibrium,
their bidding distributions are the same for those two auctions.
Cheng and Tan have established a similar bid-equivalence between an asymmet-
ric first price IPV auction with resale and a first price common value auction with a
suitably chosen common value function that reflects the transaction price. Using a
discrete distribution example, they have shown a revenue-efficiency trade-off when
the resale market has a monopoly/monopsony structure. Efficiency is the highest
when the resale market is a buyer’s market (i.e. a monopsony), while revenue is
higher when the resale market is a seller’s market (i.e. a monopoly). This ties in
with Haile’s (2003) result on surplus extraction.
On the experimental front, there have been very few related studies. Mueller et
al. (2002) report experimental evidence on revenue and efficiency effects under the
monopoly/monopsony structures using a double auction setting. They find average
prices rising under monopoly and falling under monopsony with relatively no impact
on efficiency compared to the competitive case. In their experiments, the subjects
are assigned the tradable coupons before the double auctions begin. Hence, their
setting effectively has only one stage.
Lange et al. (2004) build upon Haile (2003) and provide experimental support
for the result that bids are higher in auctions with resale than those without, empha-
sizing the common value element. Their setup is a two stage game with the second
stage market structured in some experiments as an English Auction and in others
as an Optimal Auction. Players decide on the bids only during the first stage. The
second stage allocation is automated and hence, players do not make any decisions
at this stage.
Georganas and Kagel’s (2011) study is the closest to ours. Their study also
builds upon Hafalir and Krishna (2008) but their focus is on a comparison of bid-
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ding behavior across resale and no resale scenarios. The resale scenario is in fact the
monopoly resale regime. Our study incorporates two stages, consisting of an ini-
tial auction followed by a resale stage structured as monopoly/monopsony market.
The theoretical framework is built upon the model by Hafalir and Krishna (2008).
We perform experiments and compare observed patterns of behavior to theoretical
predictions.
Our motivation comes from our interest in studying and predicting the effec-
tiveness of Emission Trading Schemes. ETSs are seen as a successful market based
approach to handle the issue of pollutants and their ill-effects including climate
change. It is of interest to ask to what extent the existence of a secondary market
and its structure have a significant effect on initial bidding behavior in ETSs, as
well as how it will impact both initial and final allocative efficiency when in the near
future, more stringent caps will generate higher demand in the secondary market.
Some of the emission allowance futures and option contract trades are carried out
via the over the counter (OTC) exchange through bilateral negotiations. There have
been speculations about possible market concentrations in the event of an interna-
tional cap and trade system. It is suggested that the US will be a dominant buyer
and the countries from Former Soviet Bloc would be dominant suppliers of pollution
permits under Annex I of Kyoto protocol (Nordhaus and Boyer, 1998).2 This might
give enormous leverage to the supplier countries to exercise their monopoly power
and drive up allowance prices.
2In the climate change conference of 2011, held in Durban, South Africa, the countries of the
EU and a number of other developed countries have signed up to a second commitment period
of the Kyoto Protocol, that ends in 2013. This will ensure that there is still some form of legally
binding treaty in place to cut carbon emission before the new agreement made by 190 participating
countries including the US, China and India takes effect at the end of 2020 (Gray, 2011 ).
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2.2 Theoretical Framework
Two risk-neutral bidders are participating in a first-price independent private value
sealed bid auction. After the conclusion of the auction the winner has the opportu-
nity to participate in a monopoly (monopsony) resale market. The winner (loser)
of the first stage auction can make a take-it-or-leave-it offer to sell (buy) the object
to (from) the same opponent. Both bidders’ values are drawn from independent
uniform distributions with different supports. The weak bidder’s value is an inde-
pendent and identically distributed (iid) draw from U[0, aw] wherein aw is set at
10 in all experimental sessions that follow. The strong bidder’s value is an iid draw
from U[0, as] wherein as takes on the values 20 and 40 in two treatments of the
experiment. We refer to the former treatment as S20 and the latter as S40.
Bidding distributions and the type of resale regime are common knowledge
among the players. Players only know their own values and their own bids dur-
ing the course of the game. They do not learn the private values or bids of their
opponents.
Consider the auction followed by a resale market with monopoly power. This
implies that the winner of the first auction has all the bargaining power in the
secondary market. We first state the problem in general terms using F (.) as the
cumulative density function.
The problem for a bidder j winning the primary auction with a bid b is to
determine an optimal price p that maximizes the revenue function Rj
max
p
Rj = [Fi(φi(b))− Fi(p)]p+ Fi(p)vj
where φ is the inverse bidding function. The first term is the expected payoff from
selling in the second stage. The term in the bracket is the probability that the price
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is less than or equal to the opponent’s value. The second term in this expression
is the expected payoff of bidder i when the price exceeds the opponent’s value and
there is no trade.
Consequently, the problem for bidder j choosing the optimal bid in the primary
auction market can be stated as
max
b
Πj = Rj(p, b)− Fi(φi(b))b
where the first term is the expected revenue from the resale stage and the second
term is the cost to bidder j.
Similarly, consider the auction followed by a resale market with monopsony
power. The loser of the first auction has all the bargaining power in the secondary
market. The problem for bidder j losing the primary auction with a bid b is to
determine an optimal price r that maximizes the following resale profit function Sj
max
r
Sj = [Fi(r)− Fi(φi(b))](vj − r).
The term in brackets is the probability of trade, which is determined by the resale
price being greater than or equal to the opponent’s value. Hence, Sj(r, b) represents
the maximum expected revenue received from the resale stage by bidder j.




Πj = Fi(φi(b))(vj − b) + Sj(r, b)
where Fi(φi(b)) is the probability of winning in the first stage.
The equilibrium bidding functions for each regime under the assumption of uni-
form distribution of values are described in Table 2.1 where again, as and aw are
the upper bounds of the strong and weak bidder’s support respectively and vi is
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the value for individual bidder i. The bid functions for the monopoly resale regime
follow directly from Hafalir and Krishna (2008) using the symmetrization property.
The results under the monopsony resale are derived along the same lines but require
some elucidation.3 The weak bidder’s value distribution sets an upper bound for
the pricing distribution in the secondary market. The highest price offered by the
strong bidder in the resale market should not exceed the upper bound of the weak
bidder’s value distribution. Following Lebrun (2010), the equilibrium bid function
for the monopsony resale is defined over two intervals. For the first part, it is exactly
the same as that in the monopoly resale regime. However, note that the bid and
the resale price can never exceed the weak bidder’s highest value. Hence for bids
greater than aw
2
, the optimal price is merely aw. Once the resale price bound is
known, we can derive equilibrium bidding strategies for each player. The bidding
functions are monotonic, continuous and increasing.
Table 2.1: Equilibrium bidding functions
Monopoly Resale Monopsony Resale










∀ 2awasaw + as ≤ vs ≤ as














≤ vw ≤ aw
The optimal price in each regime depends on the inverse bidding functions φi(b)
and φj(b). The price function is p = 2b in the monopoly resale regime. Under the
monopsony resale regime, the price function is r = 2b for bids less than or equal
to aw
2
and r = aw for bids exceeding
aw
2
. In our setup, resale happens invariably
from weak to strong bidders. Note that the resale price distribution under the
monopsony resale regime can not exceed the weak bidder’s value distribution. On
3Please see the appendix A.1 for a complete derivation.
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the other hand, the resale price distribution lies halfway between the strong and
weak bidder’s value distributions under the monopoly resale regime.


























































Figure 2.1: Theoretical bids and resale prices offered by values
In Figure 2.1, we present theoretical bids and resale prices as functions of values
under both treatments. The solid lines represent bids in the upper panels and prices
in the lower panels under the monopoly resale regime, and the dashed lines represent
bids/prices under the monopsony resale regime. This allows a visual comparison
of the relationship between the bidding and pricing functions of strong and weak
bidders in the S20 and S40 treatments. Note that the equilibrium bids for weak and
strong type bidders are in proportion to the ratio of their value distribution. i.e.
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the weak bidder bids twice as much as the strong bidder in the S20 treatment and
four times as much in the S40 treatment for both regimes, as shown in the top two
panels of Figure 2.1.
These strategies lead to the following testable predictions (TP):
TP1. The bid distributions for weak and strong bidders are identical under each
regime (Symmetrization property).
TP2. For any given set of asymmetric value distributions, equilibrium bids are
higher under the monopoly resale regime than under the monopsony resale regime.
TP3. Resale prices are higher under the monopoly resale regime than under
the monopsony resale regime.
The lower two panels of Figure 2.1 present the price as a function of the value
of the bidder making an offer at the resale stage. This difference in prices leads
to differential efficiency effects across regimes. We consider allocative efficiency and
measure it as the ratio of the number of outcomes where the person with the highest
value ends up owning the commodity to the total number of outcomes. In theory,
we have the same interim efficiency under both regimes (i.e. the same number of
mis-allocated outcomes at the end of the auction stage). However, there is higher
efficiency at the end of the resale stage under the monopsony resale regime. This is
due to the certainty of trade in cases when the strong bidder quotes a resale price of
aw to the weak bidder after losing the auction. The sure trade property mentioned
in Hafalir and Krishna (2008) ensures more trades in the monopsony regime with
a quote of aw. Further, the higher the asymmetry among bidder distributions, the
starker the efficiency effects become. As the variance of the strong bidder’s value
distribution increases relative to the weak bidder’s distribution, more trades are
realized under monopsony resale than under monopoly resale. As a result, we have:
TP4. There is a revenue-efficiency trade-off between the two regimes. i.e. the
monopoly resale regime leads to higher auction revenue on average but lower final
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efficiency, whereas the monopsony resale regime leads to lower auction revenue but
higher final efficiency.4
2.3 Experimental Design
Our experimental design incorporates the details of this theory. We have two types
of bidders and two resale regimes. Since our focus is on understanding bidding
behavior across resale regimes, we kept the player types constant throughout the
course of a session. Instructions were distributed to subjects at the beginning of
each session. There were 40 rounds in each session divided equally between the
monopoly and monopsony resale regimes. The software5 was developed using z-
Tree (Fishbacher, 2007).
Players received 65 ruchmas (our experimental currency) as the show up fee
that was used as initial capital in the S20 treatment. For the S40 treatment, players
received 100 ruchmas to account for a larger disparity in the value distributions
of bidders. The conversion rate was 1$ = 13 ruchmas. At the beginning of ev-
ery session, instructions were read to the players accompanied by a Power Point
presentation.6
There were two practice rounds followed by twenty rounds played for cash under
each regime. Valuations were drawn randomly for each round. The players were
reminded of their types at the beginning of each round. Each player was matched
with an opponent of the other type, and the matching was changed randomly from
one round to another. The information revealed was in line with the theoretical
model. Each player knew his own type and own private value. At the end of the
auction, each player was informed whether he won or not. In the second stage that
4Cheng and Tan (2008) were the first to provide evidence of this tradeoff using discrete type
distributions.
5z-Tree screen shots of experiment and code can be found in appendix A.4
6Please see appendix A.3 for instructions.
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followed immediately, the winning (losing) player had an opportunity to make a
take-it-or-leave-it offer to sell (buy) to (from) the same opponent under monopoly
(monopsony) resale treatment. If the player did not want to sell (buy), he was
advised to quote a price of 9999 (0) ruchmas. Each round concluded with the
final payoff displayed to each player depending on the outcome. The resale rules
and players’ value distributions were common knowledge. We did not provide the
players with a history of their bidding or earlier prices, since we wanted them to
treat each round independently as much as possible. The instructions emphasized
that each draw of value was separate. After two practice rounds and twenty paid
rounds of monopoly resale treatment, players were informed about the change in
resale treatment. This was followed by another two practice rounds and twenty paid
rounds of monopsony resale treatment. A brief questionnaire followed that asked
the players about some demographic information related to their major, previous
experience participating in auctions, risk preferences and gender.7 The player’s
ending balance was shown on the screen at the end of the questionnaire. This
concluded a typical session. Players received their earnings in Sooner Sense credit
on their university identity cards, which could be used for purchases around campus.
The players were recruited from the undergraduate and graduate student population
at the University of Oklahoma, Norman campus. For the S20 treatment, the number
of subjects per session varied from 4 to 12 with a total of 68 participants. For the
S40 treatment, the number of subjects per session ranged between 6 and 12 with a
total of 54 participants.
7Please see appendix A.2 for the questionnaire.
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2.4 Results And Discussion
2.4.1 Summary statistics: Participant Sample
In table 2.2, we present summary statistics of the participants from both treatments
based on the questionnaire mentioned in the previous section.
Table 2.2: Summary statistics: Participant sample








Physical Sciences 3 1
Engineering 12 16
Humanities 2 0
Social Sciences 22 14
Business and Finance 25 21
Life Sciences 3 1
Health Sciences 1 1
Attitude toward risk
Risk Neutral 20 14
Risk Averse 40 35
Risk Loving 8 5
Previous participation in real life auctions
Yes 28 22
No 40 32
Previous participation in auction experiments
Yes 5 2
No 63 52
Total participants 68 54
Our participants were predominantly male undergraduates as seen in the table.
A majority of them were from Business/Finance, Social Sciences and Engineering
disciplines. About sixty percent of all participants characterized themselves as risk
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averse while twenty eight percent seem to be risk neutral. More than forty percent of
all participants had participated previously in real life auctions but only six percent
had participated in an auction experiment.
2.4.2 Descriptive Statistics: Bids
In Table 2.3, we show some of the descriptive statistics from the S20 and S40
treatments.
Table 2.3: Descriptive statistics
S20 Treatment
Monopoly Resale
Rounds N Average Std dev Max
1-20 1348 5.729 (3.764) 3.410 20 (7.5)
11-20 678 5.626 (3.758) 3.283 17.76 (7.5)
Monopsony Resale
1-20 1358 5.101 (3.690) 2.838 15.09 (6.67)
11-20 678 5.034 (3.740) 2.736 15.00 (6.67)
S40 Treatment
Monopoly Resale
Rounds N Average Std dev Max
1-20 1080 8.48 (6.137) 7.376 40 (12.50)
11-20 540 7.786 (6.392) 6.584 39 (12.50)
Monopsony Resale
1-20 1080 6.345 (5.209) 5.13 34.00 (8.00)
11-20 540 6.043 (5.08) 4.778 30.88 (8.00)
Theoretical predictions are in brackets.
As seen from the table, the average bids and standard deviations are higher under
the monopoly resale regime than under the monopsony resale regime. While bidding
in rounds 11-20 is isolated to examine more experienced bidders, the qualitative
results remain the same across.8
We also provide a non-parametric test to compare bid distributions across bidder
types under each regime and test TP2. We employ the Mann-Whitney test under
8We compare average and median bids by player types to find, once again, evidence of higher
bidding under monopoly resale than under monopsony resale.
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the null of equality of bid distributions for the two regimes to test for difference in the
location across the two samples. For both treatments, we reject the null at p < 0.01
(S20: z-value = 4.405, N = 1348 and S40: z-value = 6.433, N= 1080). The estimated
probabilities of bids under monopoly resale exceeding those under monopsony resale
are 0.549 and 0.580 respectively under the two treatments. Given the results of this
test, the prediction that average bids are higher under the monopoly resale regime
than the monopsony resale regime is borne out.
Bids as a function of values using box and whiskers plots for the S20 and S40



















































































































































Figure 2.3: Box and whiskers plot of actual bids-S40 treatment
by bidder type and resale regime. The boxes represent the interquartile range and
the whiskers extend up to the outermost data point within 1.5 times the interquartile
range. The solid lines represent equilibrium bids, and the dashed lines indicate bid-
ding one’s value. Overall, the box plots are consistent with the descriptive statistics
showing higher relative bids and greater dispersion for the monopoly resale regime
and more so as the asymmetries intensify. Strong bidders bid on average above
their equilibrium bids and shade their bids more at higher values. Since bidding
higher than the weak bidder’s highest equilibrium bid is a dominated strategy for
the strong bidder, the observed pattern of bids tapering off for the strong bidder is
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consistent with the previous studies (Gueth et al. 2005).
Overbidding compared to equilibrium level is a commonly observed phenomenon
in the experimental literature (Kagel and Roth, 1995). It is also seen in these graphs,
and it is more pronounced among strong bidders. Weak bidders tend to bid closer to
their equilibrium bids except at the lower end of values under the monopoly resale
regime.
2.4.3 Bid Shading under the Prospect of Resale
The equilibrium bidding strategies under a first price auction imply some degree of
bid shading, calculated as vi − bivi for each bidder i. While the equilibrium bidding
strategies under monopoly resale require a constant proportion of bid shading for
both types of bidders, those under monopsony resale require a higher proportion of
shading at higher values.
Table 2.4: Average degree of bid shading
Weak Strong
0-3.34 3.34-6.67 6.67-10 0-6.67 6.67-13.34 13.34-20
S20 Monopoly
-3.15(0.25) -0.05(0.25) 0.10(0.25) 0.17(0.62) 0.32(0.62) 0.42(0.62)
S20 Monopsony
-2.95(0.25) 0.08(0.25) 0.15(0.28) 0.30(0.62) 0.37(0.62) 0.52(0.64)
0-4 4 - 7 7 - 10 0 - 16 16 - 28 28 - 40
S40 Monopoly
-5.52 (-0.25) -0.24(-0.25) -0.13(-0.25) 0.10(0.69) 0.48(0.69) 0.50(0.69)
S40 Monopsony
-0.59(-0.25) 0.12(-0.15) 0.11(0.10) 0.37(0.69) 0.59(0.71) 0.64(0.77)
In Table 2.4, we present the average degree of actual and predicted (in paren-
theses) bid shading under both resale regimes for the two treatments. The numbers
in the first row represent value intervals for the weak and strong bidders. For
the monopsony regime, the bidding strategies become non-linear (implying higher
shading) for values greater than 6.67 in the S20 treatment and greater than 4 in
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the S40 treatment. For the strong bidder, the relevant values are 13.34 and 16 for
the two treatments, respectively. The value intervals are constructed to account
for these cutoffs while splitting the remaining value intervals equally to achieve a
reasonable spread. Weak bidders with lower values, on average, overbid under both
resale regimes. Strong bidders, on average, do not overbid. Under monopsony re-
sale, with only one exception, the empirical observations are both qualitatively and
quantitatively closer to the equilibrium predictions than in the monopoly case.
2.4.4 Symmetrization of Bid Distributions
An important property of the equilibrium is the symmetrization of bid distribu-
tions under both regimes. Hafalir and Krishna (2008) have theoretically shown this
symmetrization under the monopoly resale regime with the monopsony resale case
outlined as an extension. The underlying idea is that both weak and strong bid-
ders treat the auction with resale as equivalent to an auction without resale that
has a common value component determined by the resale stage structure. Hence,
we expect the bid distributions for weak and strong bidders within a given resale
structure to be the same.
The kernel density estimates of bid distributions for weak and strong bidders
under monopoly and monopsony regimes in the S20 and S40 treatments are de-
picted in Figure 2.4. The bidding distributions under monopoly resale for the S20
treatment (top-left panel) exhibit close similarities to those in Georganas and Kagel
(2011).9 The bid distributions for weak and strong bidders are much closer under
the monopsony regime than under the monopoly regime (see the top-right panel).
A possible reason for this could be the lack of speculative motive on the bidder’s
part in the first stage. The two bottom panels show kernel density estimates of
9Georganas and Kagel reject the symmetrization property for sufficiently large asymmetries
similar to the level existing here in S20.
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Figure 2.4: Kernel density estimates for bid distributions.
the bid distributions for the two bidder types under each regime for the S40 treat-
ment. The bid distributions for weak and strong bidders appear quite distinct.
A Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S) test provides formal evidence of differences in size,
dispersion or central tendency. The test rejects the null of no difference between
weak and strong type bidder distributions for both regimes and both treatments at
a probability value less than one percent.10
The analysis so far has explored qualitative distributional differences without
10We tested the normalized (relative) bid distributions to control for differences in the theoret-
ical distribution of bids. They yield similar results.
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providing controls for bidder and auction heterogeneity. Next, we present a quanti-
tative analysis that controls for unobserved heterogeneity among bidders and differ-
ences in auction and bidder measurable characteristics. We first perform mean level
analysis and then apply quantile regression techniques to investigate how bidding
aggressiveness varies for different values and types of bidders across the distribution.
The basic econometric model of the relation between values and bids for both bidder
types that is derived directly from the equilibrium strategies is
biat = β1viat + β2(viat × Ai) + z
′
iatδ + αi + εiat (2.1)
where the unit of observation is a bid submitted by bidder i, in auction a, in round
t. Our dependent variable is the bid biat. The value of the bidder i in auction a and
round t is viat. Ai is an indicator variable that takes value 0 or 1 for a strong and weak
type bidder, respectively. Hence, the coefficient β2 measures the differential effect
of values on bids between a weak and a strong bidder. The vector z contains a set
of variables used to control for observed heterogeneity across bidders and auctions.
They capture a bidder’s attitude toward risk, his/her gender, academic level and
previous participation in real life auctions. It includes indicators of the order of
an auction in the experimental sequence, and the number of available bidders of
each type in a session. The bidder specific fixed effects are represented by αi. The
coefficients of our interest are β1 and β2. As mentioned in section 2, weak bidders
bid twice as much as strong bidders in the S20 treatment and four times as much
in the S40 treatment. Hence, we expect β1 = β2 in the S20 treatment under each
regime and β2 = 3β1 in the S40 treatment.
A simple quantile regression model allows us to investigate more systematically
how the effect of key controls varies across the distribution of bids reducing the
impact of outlier values. Since there is a differential effect by bidder type upon bids
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Table 2.5: Mean level and quantile regression results for actual bids
Quantiles Mean Level
Variables 0.25 0.5 0.75
Treatment S20 Monopoly Resale
Value(β1) 0.489* 0.534* 0.589* 0.505*
(0.014) (0.019) (0.025) (0.015)
Value × Weak Bidder Indicator 0.331* 0.323* 0.272* 0.213*
(β2) (0.023) (0.025) (0.032) (0.033)
p-value from testing H0 : β2 = β1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Treatment S20 Monopsony Resale
Value(β1) 0.394* 0.404* 0.443* 0.396*
(0.019) (0.021) (0.032) (0.013)
Value × Weak Bidder Indicator 0.401* 0.424* 0.389* 0.323*
(β2) (0.025) (0.028) (0.037) (0.023)
p-value from testing H0 : β2 = β1 0.858 0.658 0.417 0.028
Treatment S40 Monopoly Resale
Value(β1) 0.303* 0.346* 0.435* 0.427*
(0.029) (0.032) (0.056) (0.023)
Value × Weak Bidder Indicator 0.569* 0.546* 0.411* 0.393*
(β2) (0.041) (0.047) (0.074) (0.079)
p-value from testing H0 : β2 = 3β1 0.005 0.000 0.000 0.000
Treatment S40 Monopsony Resale
Value(β1) 0.200* 0.242* 0.267* 0.295*
(0.022) (0.023) (0.022) (0.015)
Value × Weak Bidder Indicator 0.578* 0.626* 0.596* 0.504*
(β2) (0.040) (0.034) (0.037) (0.035)
p-value from testing H0 : β2 = 3β1 0.810 0.315 0.030 0.000
Standard errors are in parentheses. * denotes statistically different from zero at 0.01 level of
significance. N = 1348 for S20 Monopoly Resale, N = 1358 for Monopsony Resale. N = 1080 for
S40 Monopoly Resale and S40 Monopsony Resale.
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across the value distribution, the model can shed light on symmetrization (TP1).
Following Koenker and Bassett (1978), Koenker (2005) and Lamarche (2006), we
propose the following simple quantile regression model:
Qbiat(τ |xiat) = xiatγ(τ) (2.2)
where Q(.|.) is the τ -th conditional quantile function, γ(τ) = (β1(τ), β2(τ), δ(τ)′)′ is
the vector of parameters and xiat = [vi, viat × Ai, z′iat] is the vector of covariates.








ρτ (biat − x′iatγ(τ)) (2.3)
where ρτ (u) = u(τ − I(u < 0)) is the quantile regression “check function.” We
restrict attention to three quantiles τ = {0.25, 0.50, 0.75}.
In Table 2.5, we report mean level and quantile regression results for bids in the
monopoly and monopsony regimes under the S20 and S40 treatments. Using F-tests
of the difference in bidding intensity between strong and weak bidders under the
two regimes, we test for symmetrization.11 Notice that the results from mean level
regressions lead to rejection of H0 for all cases at a 5 percent level of significance.
Outliers can impact significantly mean level regressions. However, the conditional
quantile regression results based on the 0.25, 0.5 and 0.75 quantile estimates provide
some support for symmetrization under the monopsony regime for the middle range
values of the bid distribution, but not under monopoly resale.
11As mentioned earlier, the hypotheses tested are that β2 = β1 and β2 = 3β1 for the S20 and
the S40 treatment respectively.
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2.4.5 Resale Price Comparisons
According to TP3, we expect higher resale prices under the monopoly resale regime
compared to the monopsony resale regime conditional on trade in the second stage.
The disparity in resale prices can be perceived as an indication of speculative be-
havior on the part of the weak bidder under the monopoly resale regime.
The experimental data shows higher resale prices on average under monopoly
resale as expected and provides support for TP3. For the S20 treatment, on average,
the resale price is 33% higher under monopoly resale than under monopsony resale
conditional upon trade in the resale stage (t = 5.168, N = 217, p < 0.01). For the
S40 treatment, the average resale price conditional on trade at the resale stage is
about 28% higher under monopoly resale than under monopsony resale (t = 3.187,
N= 169, p < 0.01). We further employ Mann-Whitney tests to compare the equality
of resale price distributions under monopoly and monopsony resale conditional upon
trading at the resale stage. The null of equality of resale prices between monopoly
and monopsony resale is rejected for both the S20 (z-value = 4.317, p < 0.01) and
the S40 (z-value = 2.054, p = 0.04) treatments. Further, the estimated probabilities
of the monopoly resale price exceeding the monopsony resale price are 0.670 and
0.592 respectively for the S20 and S40 treatments.
2.4.6 Efficiency Comparisons
We consider two definitions of efficiency. In the first definition, we use the ratio
of number of outcomes, wherein a high value bidder wins to the total number of
outcomes. In Table 2.6, we describe the interim (auction stage) and final (resale
stage) efficiency comparisons for both treatments using data from all periods.12
Interim efficiency is higher than predicted but almost equal across regimes for the
12The calculations for both tables using periods 11 - 20 are consistent with these numbers.
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S20 treatment. The final efficiency levels are also similar with monopoly resale
registering higher actual efficiency than predicted.
For the S40 treatment, interim efficiency for both regimes is much higher than
predicted. Final efficiency for monopsony resale is relatively higher, providing sup-
port for TP4 only in this case.
Table 2.6: Efficiency calculations - I
Efficiency (in percent)
Interim Final
Predicted Actual Predicted Actual
S20 Monopoly 75.00 80.71 87.50 90.80
S20 Monopsony 75.00 80.11 91.67 90.42
S40 Monopoly 62.50 77.03 81.25 87.96
S40 Monopsony 62.50 79.25 92.50 92.78
Table 2.7: Efficiency calculations - II
Efficiency (in percent)
Interim Final
Predicted Actual Predicted Actual
S20 Monopoly 91.67 91.37 97.56 96.40
S20 Monopsony 92.07 91.73 99.00 96.91
S40 Monopoly 79.70 85.66 93.25 93.64
S40 Monopsony 81.06 89.34 98.38 97.34
We also report efficiency calculations based on another widely used measure.
This definition employs the average value of the ratio vi
max{vi,v−i} , where the numer-
ator, vi, is the owner’s value at a given stage and the denominator is the maximum
of the values of everyone else who is part of the market at that stage. Unlike the
previous measure, which relies on the count of efficient versus inefficient outcomes,
the current measure focuses on the average magnitude of lost surplus. In Table
2.7, we report the predicted and actual efficiencies based on this approach. Actual
interim efficiencies for the S20 treatment are about the same across regimes and
similar to the predictions. Actual final efficiencies are also similar in magnitude
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for the two regimes but lower than predicted. For the S40 treatment, the observed
interim efficiencies are higher than predicted and even more so for the monopsony
resale. The observed final efficiencies are much closer to the predictions, implying
a higher lost surplus under the monopoly resale compared to monopsony resale.
2.5 Conclusions
We derive equilibrium bidding distributions in an auction with monopsony resale
and compare them to those derived in Hafalir and Krishna (2008) for auctions with
monopoly resale. The shift of bargaining power from seller to buyer tends to reduce
speculative tendencies on the bidder’s part, leading to differential revenue and effi-
ciency outcomes. Our experimental results show that bids are indeed higher under
the monopoly resale regime than the monopsony resale regime across both treat-
ments. The resale prices conditional on trade in the secondary market are higher
under monopoly resale. The actual number of efficient outcomes (both interim and
final) are higher than predicted. Our quantitative analysis, providing controls for
bidder and auction level characteristics, offers some support to symmetrization only
in the monopsony case.
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Chapter 3
Bargaining in Auctions with Resale
This chapter continues the study of bidding behavior in first price private value
asymmetric auctions followed by resale. This setup introduces equal bargaining
power to buyer and seller in the resale stage resulting in equilibrium bidding and
pricing functions to fall midway between those for the same setup under monopoly
resale (seller’s market) and monopsony resale (buyer’s market) along with sym-
metrization of bids. Controlled experiments are employed that mimic the theoretical
setup. This setup enables us to shed light on the workings of real world markets1.
3.1 Introduction
Bilateral bargaining under incomplete information is one of the ‘classic’ economic
problems. In a way, it represents the essence of a market at the most fundamental
level, where two parties knowing their reservation values about a good are willing to
make a trade. While a mutually beneficial trade may be possible in these circum-
stances, the individual parties have an incentive to hide their true valuations thereby
precluding trade. Hence, there are serious limitations in designing a mechanism that
would ensure honest revelation of preferences and ex-post efficient allocation with-
out any external subsidy (Vickrey, 1961). Interestingly, the problem of efficiency
is mitigated when the number of trading parties increases under a standard dou-
ble auction framework (Satterthwaite and Williams, 1989, Williams, 1991). More
than often, bargaining occurs in a secondary market preceded by a sale through a
mechanism that invites broad participation such as an auction setting.
The empirical motivation to consider the second format comes from electricity
1A secondary market for emission trading is, for example, Chicago Climate Futures Exchange
(CCFE) that operates as a double auction environment
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markets, emission trading markets as well as markets for second-hand automobiles.
For instance, the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI), a recent emission
trading scheme in the US2 that has auctioned off emission allowances over last four
years which have been trading on the Chicago Climate Exchange (CCX) via stan-
dard futures and options contracts. Auctions followed by resale opportunities have
been receiving attention in theoretical and experimental literature following Haile’s
early works (1999, 2001, 2003). More recently, Hafalir and Krishna (2008) along
with Cheng and Tan (2008) have established a theoretical framework that derives
an equivalence between a first price private value asymmetric auction with resale
and a first price symmetric auction without resale whose valuations are governed
by the resale price structure. The upshot of this analysis is that the (asymmetric)
bidders behave as if they are participating in a symmetric auction hence facilitating
the derivation of equilibrium bidding strategies in the first stage. Georganas and
Kagel (2011) provide experimental evidence on bidding behavior between resale and
no resale regime and provide some evidence for symmetrization under a monopoly
resale regime (where the seller has all the bargaining power in the resale stage). Jog
and Kosmopoulou (2012) extend the analysis to a monopsony resale regime (where
the buyer has all the bargaining power in the resale stage) based on this framework
using controlled experiments and find evidence for higher first stage bidding under
monopoly resale compared to monopsony resale.
In this chapter, we extend the analysis further to negotiations that allow a
balance in bargaining power and settings that are representing a broader set of
markets. Specifically, we have an asymmetric first price auction between a pair of
weak-strong bidders followed by a double auction resale between the same bidders.
Thus, the buyer and seller in the resale stage have equal bargaining power. We
employ two treatments involving different distributional supports in order to be
2Please see www.rggi.org for details
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consistent with our earlier results as well as provide a robustness check on the
theoretical results. Overall, we find the average bids and efficiency values under
double auction resale leaning toward the empirical results from monopsony resale
case.
In the next subsection, we review related literature. It is followed by laying out
the theoretical framework and derivation of equilibrium bidding functions under
double auction resale regime. Section 3.3 delineates the experimental design with
special reference to innovations in the instructions. Descriptive statistics and main
results are summarized in section 3.4. The last section offers concluding remarks.
3.1.1 Related Literature
Chatterjee and Samuelson (1983) studied bilateral bargaining under incomplete in-
formation with single buyer and seller having private values drawn from a commonly
known distribution and derived linear equilibrium bidding strategies. In this setup,
trade takes place if buyer’s offer is greater than or equal to the seller’s offer at a
price P = kb + (1 − k)s, where b and s are respectively buyer’s and seller’s offer.
The parameter k lies between [0,1] and dictates the bargaining rule. Using uniform
distribution of values the authors show that k = 0.5 leads to the highest proba-
bility of trade as well as the maximum sum of profits for both parties (ex-ante).
This ‘split-the-difference’ bargaining rule is optimal in a limited sense in that it is
a ‘second-best’ solution given the informational constraints of this setup.
A more comprehensive treatment of bilateral bargaining is by Myerson and Sat-
terthwaite (1983), where they derive the set of allocation mechanisms that possess
two important properties, viz. (Bayesian) incentive compatibility and individual
rationality. They show that for such mechanisms to be ex-post efficient, outside
subsidies are inevitable. Multiple equlibria based on players’ beliefs are examined
in Satterthwaite and Williams (1989) and Leininger et al. (1989) with each equilib-
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rium leading to a different level of efficiency. Radner and Schotter (1989) provide
experimental evidence for ‘linear’ bidding strategies in bilateral bargaining under
incomplete information. They find that with experience, outside equilibria (such as
a ‘step-function’ equlibria) can be supported.
Maskin and Riley (2000) investigate private value asymmetric auctions and de-
rive equilibrium bidding strategies for a pair of ‘weak-strong’ bidders. They find
that the expected revenue under the first price sealed bid auction may be higher or
lower than English auction, thus voiding the revenue equivalence. The weak-type
bidder bids more aggressively in equilibrium and prefers a sealed bid auction to open
auction. Hafalir and Krishna (2008) add a resale stage to this setup of sealed bid
asymmetric auction and show that the two stage asymmetric auction is equivalent
to a single stage symmetric auction whose valuations are governed by the resale
stage.
Cheng and Tan (2008) reach similar conclusions by a slightly different approach.
They find equivalence between an asymmetric private values auction with resale
and a single stage common value auction without resale wherein the common value
is determined by the resale stage. Despite their different approach, the equilibrium
bidding functions match up with those from Hafalir and Krishna (2008). Cheng
and Tan further employ Chatterjee and Samuelson’s (1983) linear equilibrium in
the resale stage to find bidding strategies in asymmetric auctions with resale where
the resale stage is a k-double auction between the buyer and the seller. We build
on this model to derive explicit bidding strategies under 1
2
-double auctions resale
setting for the two bidder types as described in the next section.
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3.2 Theoretical Framework
Two risk-neutral bidders participate in a first-price independent private value sealed
bid auction. The auction is followed by a resale between the same bidders. The
bidder winning (losing) the auction can make an offer to sell (buy). Trade takes
place if the buyer’s offer is at least as high as the seller’s offer. Trading price is
halfway between the offers. If buyer’s offer is less than seller’s offer, there is no
trade in the resale stage and the first stage winner keeps the object. Both bidders’
values are drawn from independent uniform distributions with different supports.
The weak bidder’s value is an independent and identically distributed (iid) draw
from U[0, aw] wherein aw is set at 10 in all experimental sessions that follow. The
strong bidder’s value is an iid draw from U[0, as] wherein as takes on values 20 and
40 in two treatments of the experiment. We refer to the former treatment as S20
and the latter as S40 for the remainder of this paper. Bidding distributions and the
type of resale regime are common knowledge among the players. Players only know
their own values and their own bids during the course of the game. They do not
learn the private values or bids of their opponents.
Under these settings, the resale takes place invariably from a weak to strong
bidder (Hafalir and Krishna, 2008). Following Cheng and Tan (2008), we first find
the (linear) resale price functions by by solving the maximization problems for a
weak bidder (seller) and a strong bidder (buyer) in the second stage. Having known
the resale price function [p(b)], we can derive the first stage bidding strategies as the







∀k = s, w.
3Please see the appendix B.1 for a detailed derivation.
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where φk(.) is the equilibrium inverse bidding function for player k.
Under the assumption of uniform distribution of values, the equilibrium bidding





















































where as and aw are the upper bounds of strong and weak bidder’s value distributions
respectively. The resulting equilibrium bidding and pricing functions are depicted
in figure 3.1. Note that in all cases, the bidding strategies for both bidder types
are proportional to the ratio of their value distributions, i.e., for a given value, the
weak bidder bids twice as much as the strong bidder under the S20 treatment and
four times under the S40 treatment for all regimes.
To put in perspective the bidding functions across various resale regimes, we
present in figure 3.2, the theoretical bidding functions under all three resale regimes
for S40 treatment. As we can see the equilibrium bidding strategies are overlapping
for the weak and strong bidders over the first half of the value distribution. For the
rest of the value distribution, we see bids under the monopoly resale regime to be
highest and those under the monopsony resale regime to be the lowest ones with
bids under the double auction regime falling in between the two.
This leads us to the following testable predictions (TP):
TP1. The average first stage bids and (resale) prices under the double auctions
resale regime lie in between those under monopoly and monopsony resale regimes.
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Figure 3.1: Theoretical bids and resale prices offered by values
TP2. (Symmetrization property). The bid distributions for weak and strong
bidders are identical under double auction resale regime.
This follows from the idea that the weak and strong bidders behave as if they are
looking after the common ‘prize’ determined by the double auction mechanism in
the resale stage. Hence the bidding distributions (as in the monopoly and monop-
sony regimes) look the same for both types in spite of the asymmetry in the value
distributions.
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Figure 3.2: Theoretical bids for all resale regimes under S40 treatment
3.3 Experimental Design
Our experimental design closely follows the theoretical setup. We have two types of
bidders and two treatments as specified earlier. The software4 was developed using
z-Tree (Fishbacher, 2007).
Players received 100 ruchmas (our experimental currency) that was used as
initial endowment in both treatments. The conversion rate was 1$ = 7 ruchmas
for the S20 treatment. For the S40 treatment, the conversion rate was 1$ = 11
4Please see appendix B.4 for the code and screen shots of the experiment.
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ruchmas to account for larger disparity among the players’ value distributions. This
ensured that the final payoffs were similar for all players in each treatment. At
the beginning of every session, instructions were distributed and read aloud to the
players accompanied by a Power Point presentation.
We would like to point out here the use of graphical examples and schematics
in our instructions is a new feature introduced to facilitate the information for the
participants. Drafting instructions for experimental subjects often poses a unique
quandary for the experimenter. While one wants the subjects to understand the
rules perfectly in order to participate, care has to be taken so as not to lead sub-
jects in any particular direction. Some of the popular solutions are using unusually
large numbers to generate contrived examples or ask subjects to answer a question-
naire5 that ensures whether the subject has understood the rules. We use graphical
examples to illustrate the procedure6 thereby avoiding any numbers. The schematics
are an attempt to provide handy and concise explanation of instructions. Informal
correspondence with participants indicated that they were able to comprehend the
instructions better because of graphs and schematics.
In a typical session, there were two practice rounds7 followed by forty rounds
played for cash. One half of the total participants in a session began as a strong(weak)
type. The player types were switched after twenty rounds. i.e., If a player started
as a strong type for the first twenty rounds, he was changed to a weak type for
the last twenty rounds and vice-versa. Valuations were randomly drawn for each
round. The players were reminded of their types at the beginning of each round.
Each player was matched with an opponent of the other type and the matching was
changed randomly from one round to another. The information revealed was in line
with the theoretical model. Each player knew his own type and own private value.
5For instance, veconlab software by Charles Holt
6Instructions can be found in appendix B.3
7S40 treatment had 4 practice rounds
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At the end of the auction stage, each player was informed whether he won or not.
In the second stage that followed immediately, both players had an opportunity
to make an offer to sell (buy) to (from) the same opponent. If the player did not
want to resell (buy), he was advised to quote a price of 21(0) ruchmas [41(0) in
S40 treatment]. Trade took place if the buyer’s offer was at least as high as the
seller’s offer. In the case of a trade, the trading price was a simple average of the
two offers. If there was no trade in the second stage, the first stage winner kept the
item. Each round concluded with the final payoff and trading price (if trade went
through) displayed to each player depending on the particular outcome. The resale
rules and players’ value distributions were common knowledge. We did not provide
the players with a history of their bidding or earlier prices since we wanted them
to treat each round as much independently as possible. After two practice rounds
and the initial twenty rounds for cash, players were informed about the change in
types for the remaining twenty rounds. A brief questionnaire followed that asked
the players about some demographic information related to their major, previous
experience in auction participation, risk preferences, native language and gender8.
A player’s ending balance was shown on the screen at the end of the questionnaire.
This concluded a typical session. Players received their earnings in sooner sense
credit on their university identity cards that could be used for purchases around
campus. The players were recruited from the graduate and undergraduate student
population at the University of Oklahoma, Norman campus. The number of players
per session varied from 4 to 12 with a total of 50 participants in six sessions for the
S20 treatment. For the S40 treatment, the number of players per session ranged
from 4 to 14 with a total of 46 players in six sessions.
8Please see appendix B.2 for the questionnaire
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3.4 Results And Discussion
3.4.1 Descriptive Statistics: Bids
In table 3.1, we present the descriptive statistics9 for both bidder types under each
treatment. Strong bidders bid, on average, higher than the weak bidders under
Table 3.1: Descriptive statistics: Bids
S20 Treatment
Strong Bidder
Rounds N Average Std dev Max
1-20 999 5.935 (3.750) 3.410 19.29 (7.14)
11-20 500 5.716 (3.707) 3.794 18.92 (7.14)
Weak Bidder
1-20 999 4.210 (3.690) 2.701 20.00 (7.14)
11-20 500 4.025 (3.740) 2.543 15.00 (7.14)
S40 Treatment
Strong Bidder
Rounds N Average Std dev Max
1-20 920 8.965 (5.590) 6.301 39.00 (10.76)
11-20 460 8.414 (5.692) 5.911 38.09 (10.76)
Weak Bidder
1-20 920 4.998 (6.123) 3.561 35.00 (10.76)
11-20 460 4.818 (6.092) 3.522 35.00 (10.76)
Theoretical predictions are in brackets.
both treatments. Further, the strong bidders’ bids exhibit higher variation than
weak bidders’ bids. The difference is more pronounced under the S40 treatment.
While weak bidders are expected to bid on average higher than the strong bidders for
the S40 treatment, the actual average bids are lower for the weak bidders. Thus, the
strong bidders overbid under both treatments but the weak bidders overbid only for
the S20 treatment. We can cite two broad reasons to explain this bidding behavior,
viz. strong bidders looking to acquire the item right at the bidding stage thus
9We isolate rounds 11-20 to focus on more experienced bidders. However, the quantitative
results are similar for the full and restricted sample.
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avoiding taking chances at the resale stage and weak bidders’ aversion to potential
losses by bidding higher in the first stage and failing to trade in the resale stage.
The latter is more evident in the S40 treatment and hence the weak bidders actually
underbid for the S40 treatment. Overall, there were lesser number of actual trades
in the resale stage under both treatments which is consistent with the above bidding











































































Figure 3.3: Box plots of actual bids
each treatment using a Kolmogorov-Smirnoff (K-S) test. The null of equality of
distributions is rejected at 1 percent probability for both cases resulting in rejection
of symmetrization prediction (TP2).
42
In figure 3.3, we present the box plots for bids by player types under both treat-
ments for different blocks of values. The horizontal lines inside the boxes represent
median and the edges of boxes represent the middle fifty percent of observations.
The whiskers extend to the most extreme point within 1.5 times the edges of a box.
The solid lines are equilibrium bids and the dotted lines represent values equal to
bids. Figure 3.3 confirms the above story as we see overbidding in all but one case,
i.e., the weak type bidder in the S40 treatment. Notice also that the weak type
bidders bid much closer to predictions under the S20 treatment. While the strong
types overbid in general, their bids come closer to predictions for values around 30
under the S40 treatment.












































Figure 3.4: Average bid deviations across rounds
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In figure 3.4, we present average bid deviations10 over auction rounds for both the
treatments. It corroborates our findings from the box plots as we see the strong bid-
der, on average, overbidding in both treatments. Overbidding is more pronounced
in the S40 treatment. Notice a small spike around round 21 in the bid deviations
indicating the switch in type. As for the weak bidder, the average bid deviations
hover around zero in the S20 treatment implying bids closer to predictions. For
the S40 treatment, the average bid deviations remain below zero for a majority of
rounds indicating underbidding.
3.4.2 Descriptive statistics: Participant Sample
As mentioned in the earlier section, all the experimental participants answered a
brief questionnaire following the auction game. We present below summary statis-
tics of the participants in the S20 and S40 treatments. Overall, the majority of
participants were male undergraduates from the disciplines of Engineering and Busi-
ness/Finance. A majority were risk averse or risk neutral. About two thirds of par-
ticipants in the S20 treatment had not previously participated in a real life auction
whereas same proportion of participants in the S40 treatment had participated in a
real life (including on-line) auction. When it came to the participation in an auction
experiment, this experiment was the first experience for almost all. Lastly, about
one third of participants’ native language was different than English.
We compare bids by various demographic characteristics of the participants for
the two regimes. Specifically, we present box plots (Figure 3.5 through 3.11) of
actual bids by gender, previous participation, attitudes toward risk for both treat-
ments and by major (Business and Finance vs. Other) for S2011 treatment. For
all the box plots, solid lines indicate equilibrium bids whereas dotted lines indicate
10Calculated as actual bid - predicted bid
11As seen in table 3.2, there aren’t enough participants majoring in Business and Finance for
the S40 treatment. Thus, we compare bids by major only for the S20 treatment
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Table 3.2: Summary Statistics: Participant sample








Physical Sciences 0 3
Engineering 14 11
Humanities 1 2
Social Sciences 5 9
Business and Finance 30 12
Life Sciences 0 7
Chemistry 0 2
Attitude toward risk
Risk Neutral 15 15
Risk Averse 29 21
Risk Loving 6 10
Previous participation in real life auctions
Yes 22 27
No 28 19
Previous participation in auction experiment
Yes 2 3
No 48 43
English is participant’s native language
Yes 34 27
No 16 19
Total participants 50 46
bidding one’s value.
Figures 3.5 and 3.6 compare bids by gender and bidder type for the S20 and S40
treatments respectively. For the S20 treatment, especially at higher value intervals,
female participants seem to bid higher than their male counterparts under both
types. For the S40 treatment, there isn’t much difference in the bidding behavior
with one exception. Male bidders with strong type overbid at values above 36
compared to the female bidders of the same type.
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Figures 3.7 and 3.8 display the box plots for bids by type and by previous
participation for the S20 and S40 treatment respectively. In the S20 treatment,
bidders with no previous experience in auctions have more dispersed bids at higher
values for both, weak and strong types. On the other hand, strong type bidders
in the S40 treatment with previous experience bid higher exhibiting more variance
than those without experience.
The next set of figures, figure 3.9 and 3.10 describe the bids under both treat-
ments by player type and the reported attitude toward risk. RN stands for risk
neutral whereas RA implies risk averse bidders. Generally speaking, risk averseness
leads to overbidding (see, Holt, 1980; Harris and Raviv, 1981; Riley and Samuelson,
1981; Krishna, 2002) in first price private value auctions, as a risk-averse bidder
puts more value on winning than a risk-neutral bidder. However, there is ambiguity
in the effect of risk aversion in first price common value auctions (Levin et. al,
1996). While the importance of winning leads one to bid higher as in private value
framework, the possibility of negative profits on winning pushes risk-averse bidders
to bid lower. The final effect on bidding depends on which of the two forces prevails.
The comparison of box-plots of RA-RN bidders by bidder type is reflective of this
ambiguity. The weak types seem to bid similarly whether they are RN/RA implying
a cancellation of the two forces mentioned above. For the strong types, the latter
factor dominates leading to relatively lower bids for RA bidders than RN bidders.
Lastly, we compare bids for participants by reported major of study depicted in
figure 3.11. We isolate the participants with Business/Finance as their major from
the participants with all other majors. For the weak type bidders, we do not find
any significant differences by their major. However, the strong type bidders with
business and finance as major bid higher displaying a larger variation in their bids


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 3.11: Box plots of actual bids by major of study: S20 Treatment
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3.4.3 Key Statistics Across Resale Regimes
In table 3.3, we present the comparison12 of key statistics that provides evidence to
test TP1. The statistics include average (first-stage) bids, average resale (second
stage) prices (conditional on trade in second stage) and two measures of interim
(first stage) and final efficiencies. While the first two statistics are obvious, the
efficiency measures require elucidation.
Under the first measure of efficiency, we consider the ratio of instances where a
person with higher valuation wins the auction stage to the total number of auction
instances to arrive at interim efficiency (IE-1). Final efficiency under this measure
(FE-1) consists of the ratio of instances where the person with high valuation ends
up owning the item at the end of the resale stage to total number of auctions.
Another popular measure of efficiency that we consider gives an account of sur-
plus lost in terms of value instead of mere number of instances. Under this measure,
the interim efficiency (IE-2) is the average value of the ratio of first stage winner’s
value to the maximum of the two players’ values. Similarly, final efficiency (FE-2) is
the average value of the ratio of the value of item’s owner at the end of the second
stage to the maximum of the two players’ values.
As seen in table 3.3, the average bids and resale prices for DA regime are slightly
lower than both, the monopoly and monopsony resale regimes in the S20 treatment.
For the S40 treatment, while the average bids and resale prices for DA are in be-
tween those from the monopoly and monopsony regimes the DA values are closer
to monopsony values in all cases. It indicates greater bargaining power exploited
by the buyer even though the DA offers equal bargaining power in theory to buyer
and seller in the resale stage.
With regards to efficiency measures, we observe relatively higher interim effi-
12Values for monopoly and monopsony resale regime are reported in Jog and Kosmopoulou
(2012)
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Table 3.3: Comparison of key statistics across resale regimes
Statistic Monopoly S20 DA S20 Monopsony S20
Avg Bid (all rounds) 5.73 5.07 5.10
Avg Bid (Last 10 Rounds) 5.62 4.87 5.03
Avg Resale Price 8.51 6.70 6.78
Actual Interim Eff. (IE-1) 80.71 82.28 80.11
Actual Final Eff.(FE-1) 90.80 86.88 90.42
Actual Interim Eff.(IE-2) 91.37 92.83 91.73
Actual Final Eff.(FE-2) 96.40 96.57 96.91
Statistic Monopoly S40 DA S40 Monopsony S40
Avg Bid (all rounds) 8.48 6.98 6.34
Avg Bid (Last 10 Rounds) 7.78 6.61 6.04
Avg Resale Price 10.88 9.46 8.17
Actual Interim Eff. (IE-1) 77.03 86.19 79.25
Actual Final Eff. (FE-1) 87.96 91.30 92.78
Actual Interim Eff. (IE-2) 85.66 92.87 89.34
Actual Final Eff.(FE-2) 93.64 95.76 97.34
DA: Double auction. All the efficiency values are in percent.
ciency under the DA compared to the monopoly and monopsony regimes for both
treatments. It is true for both efficiency measures, IE-1 and IE-2 under both treat-
ments. This is consistent with the analysis of bidding behavior where we observed
the inclination of strong bidders towards acquiring the item by overbidding in the
initial stage and avoid any trade in the resale stage. The final efficiency values (FE-
1) for both treatments indicate relatively lower amount of trades in the resale stage.
Final efficiency values in terms of lost surplus (FE-2) for the DA fall in between its
monopoly and monopsony counterparts for the S20 and S40 treatments providing
a smoother transition across regimes. The upshot of this analysis is that we have
limited evidence for supporting TP1. While the resale prices for both treatments
and average bids for the S40 treatment under the DA regime fall between those
under monopoly and monopsony resale, the average bids for the S20 treatment do
not. Further, the DA values for bids and prices are relatively closer to monopsony
values precluding a very smooth transition13 as expected.
13We intend to carry out a few more sessions to generate more data points.
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3.4.4 Bid Shading Across Resale Regimes
Next, we compare the extent of bid shading across the three resale regimes. In a
first price auction, equilibrium bidding strategy implies some form of reduction or
shading of bids from one’s value (unlike the second price auction where bidding
one’s value is the dominant strategy). It follows from the description of equilibrium
bidding strategies (figure 3.2) under the three resale regimes that the amount of bid
shading14 is identical under the three regimes for values in the first half of the value
distribution of each bidder. Thereafter, the amount of bid shading under the DA
lies between the monopoly and monopsony resale regimes for the rest of the value
distribution for each bidder.
We present a comparison of average bid shading under the three resale regimes
in table 3.4 by bidder types. The value intervals for each bidder in bold type are
created to provide comparable sizes that divide the value distribution as equally
as possible and account for non-linear part of equilibrium bidding strategies. The
upper panel of the table presents results for the S20 treatment and the lower panel
describes the same for the S40 treatment under all regimes. Overall, we find the
average bid shading is increasing as expected across the value intervals for all three
regimes with just two exceptions. While the average bid shading is higher for the
weak bidder under the DA regime compared to the other two for the S20 treatment,
it is closer to monopsony regime for the S40 treatment. In fact, notice that the
amount of average bid shading remains almost same for the last two value intervals
under the monopsony and DA regimes. Strong bidder, on average, never overbids
under all regimes. For lower value interval (0-6.67), the strong bidder bids much
closer to value leading to a much lower shading of bids than predicted under the DA
regime for the S20 treatment. Apart from that case, we find the average bid shading
14Bid shading is defined as vi−bivi for a bidder iwith value vi and equilibrium bid bi
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Table 3.4: Bid shading across resale regimes
Weak Bidder Strong Bidder
0-3.34 3.34-6.67 6.67-10 0-6.67 6.67-13.34 13.34-20
S20 Monopoly
-3.15(0.25) -0.05(0.25) 0.10(0.25) 0.17(0.62) 0.32(0.62) 0.42(0.62)
S20 Monopsony
-2.95(0.25) 0.08(0.25) 0.15(0.28) 0.30(0.62) 0.37(0.62) 0.52(0.64)
S20 Double auctions
0-3.34 3.34-7.14 7.14-10 0-6.67 6.67-14.28 14.28-20
-1.73(0.25) 0.16(0.25) 0.21(0.26) 0.09(0.62) 0.36(0.62) 0.46(0.63)
Weak Bidder Strong Bidder
0-4 4 - 7 7 - 10 0 - 16 16 - 28 28 - 40
S40 Monopoly
-5.52 (-0.25) -0.24(-0.25) -0.13(-0.25) 0.10(0.69) 0.48(0.69) 0.50(0.69)
S40 Monopsony
-0.59(-0.25) 0.12(-0.15) 0.11(0.10) 0.37(0.69) 0.59(0.71) 0.64(0.77)
S40 Double auctions
0-5.38 5.38-7.5 7.5-10 0-21.5 21.5-30 30-40
-0.68(-0.25) 0.09(-0.22) 0.08(-0.12) 0.24(0.69) 0.57(0.693) 0.60(0.71)
Theoretical predictions are in brackets.
under DA falling between its monopoly and monopsony counterparts. But the bid
shading under DA is much closer to monopsony than the monopoly regime once
again indicating the prevalence of buyer’s bargaining power under the DA regime.
3.5 Conclusions
This chapter continued the study of bidding behavior under asymmetric auctions
with resale by introducing a double auction framework in the resale stage where
both, buyer and seller make offers. Following Cheng and Tan (2008), we derived
equilibrium bidding and pricing functions for two bidders with values distributed
uniformly over asymmetric intervals. While the theoretical predictions indicate
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average bids and prices to fall between those from the monopoly and monopsony
resale regime implying a smooth transition, the experimental evidence so far, does
not support it. The resale prices for both treatments as well as average bids under
the S40 treatment for the DA fall in between the monopoly and monopsony values.
However, the bids and prices under the DA are closer to the monopsony values
implying relatively a bit more bargaining power for the buyers in resale stage. These
trends are consistent with the amount of average bid shading by each bidder. Strong
bidders bid much higher than predictions leading to higher interim efficiencies and
less number of trades in the resale stage.
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Chapter 4
Emission Trading Schemes as Auctions with Resale
This chapter reviews emission trading schemes (ETS) as auctions with resale with
particular reference to the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI), one of the
largest cap-and-trade schemes in the US. We hope to use the theoretical and exper-
imental investigation of auctions with resale from the previous analysis to provide
insights in understanding the workings of these schemes.
4.1 Background
Climate change is at the center of recent developments in energy and economic policy
in the US. The principal cause of global warming is considered to be emissions of
gases like Carbon Dioxide (CO2), Methane (CH4) and few others, collectively called
as Greenhouse Gases (GHG). Fossil fuel consumption and electricity generation are
two of the most polluting activities that contribute to GHG emissions.
In the last two decades, emission trading schemes (also known as cap-and-trade
schemes) are seen to be a preferred choice over the traditional command and control
approach to GHG emissions. The command and control approach emphasizes on
regulating the firm/entity responsible for pollution at the source level followed by
periodic inspections. Under this approach, the affected entity does not have much
say in the process of reducing pollution nor any incentive to do more than what
the regulator asks for. On the other hand, an emissions trading scheme (ETS
henceforth) involves setting up specific performance targets (a Cap) for a specific
class of emitters by a central agency and allocating emission permits to the affected
entities. The emission permits are freely tradable among the entities; hence the
market decides the best course of compliance strategies while the central agency
keeps a strict record of total emissions. The main appeal of an ETS is the flexibility it
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offers to affected sources to manage their emissions which is lacking in the command
and control approach.
The Acid Rain Program (ARP) and Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI)
in the United States, European Union Emission Trading Scheme (EUETS) are some
of the most notable recent ETS from the last two decades. The major entities cov-
ered under these ETS are power plants that use fossil fuels for electricity generation.
Most recently, the state of California has announced1 a cap and trade scheme that
is expected to cover major sources of GHG emissions in the state such as refineries,
power plants, industrial facilities, and transportation fuels.
A typical ETS is characterized by two components: A primary market which
allocates the allowances/permits to the entities in the first place and a secondary
market where the entities trade the permits among themselves. Let us briefly de-
scribe the two components.
4.1.1 Primary Market
There are two ways in which the initial allowances are allocated to the affected en-
tities. The first is called ‘Grandfathering’ where an entity receives emission permits
free of charge, based on some measure of its past performance. A small part of the
allowances may be auctioned off to kick off the market and ensure liquidity from
time to time. The ARP and EUETS have employed this approach. Alternatively,
the majority/all of the initial allowances can be auctioned off so that the interested
entities have to bid for them. Countries in EUETS like UK have shown their incli-
nation towards the auction allocation in the recent years. RGGI, which came into
effect starting January 2009, has been auctioning off all allowances on a quarterly
basis.
The issue of the method of initial allocation has been in discussion from quite
1http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/capandtrade/capandtrade.htm
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some time now (Cramton and Kerr, 2002). The grandfathering scheme is criticized
on the basis of ‘windfall profits’ made by the affected entities. Although the entities
like power companies get the allowances for free under grandfathering, they (the
allowances) do have a market value and hence an opportunity cost. Hence, the
companies treat the allowances as assets on their balance sheets and account for their
‘usage’ over time to justify an increase the price of final product. This phenomenon
has been observed in the EUETS. It led to turn the public opinion at large against
the ETS.
On the contrary, RGGI auctions in the United States have been contributing
a sizable amount of revenue to the governments of the participating states. This
revenue is used for strategic investments in the power sector to stimulate innova-
tions as well as protect the consumers from possible excessive power prices. To
quote RGGI, “States sell nearly all emission allowances through auctions and invest
proceeds in consumer benefits: Energy efficiency, renewable energy, and other clean
energy technologies. RGGI will spur innovation in the clean energy economy and
create green jobs in each state.”
4.1.2 Secondary Market
The secondary market helps to provide liquidity to the affected entities across the
compliance period with respect to allowances. The method of primary allocation
may be a one-time (grandfathering) or periodical (auctions) and hence it may con-
tain fairly long time intervals between successive occurrences. The secondary market
provides a platform to transact emission permits and allows entities to choose their
plans with respect to the production process. i.e. they can buy/sell their share of
allowances according to their need as well as the market direction. In other words,
the prices in the secondary market provide correct incentives to the entities in man-
aging their resources regarding future investments. Typically, the allowances are
61
traded on organized exchanges or through bilateral arrangements (also called over
the counter or OTC) via standard financial products like futures and options. The
trades occurred in the secondary market are notified to the central agency keeping
a tab on all the allowances in the scheme through a registry. Having described
the nature of two markets in an ETS; we describe the Regional Greenhouse Gas
Initiative to get a sense of how an ETS has worked in the real world.
4.2 RGGI
The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative is the first mandatory ETS in the US that
limits CO2 emissions from electric power generators using fossil fuels. The partic-
ipating states2 are Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New
Hampshire, New York, Rhode Island, and Vermont as seen in the following figure.
RGGI covers about 225 fossil fuel-fired electric power plants of 25 megawatts (MW)
or greater in size from the above region. The program consists of two three-year
compliance periods. The first compliance period began on January 1st, 2009 and
ended on December 31st, 2011. The second compliance period runs from January
1st, 2012 through December 31st, 2014. The emission levels are capped to 2009
level and then will be lowered 2.5 percent each year starting in 2014 to achieve a
total of 10 percent reduction by 2018. The method of initial allocation for RGGI is
primarily through quarterly auctions held in the months of March, June, Septem-
ber and December of each year. The auction format is single-round, uniform-price,
sealed bid auction with a reserve price that is indexed to inflation. The participating
power plants can use allowances issued by any participating state in the program to
comply with its individual state program. The allowances have no expiration date
and are bankable for use in future.
2New Jersey left the program in December 2011. It is not a part of the second control period.
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Figure 4.1: RGGI: Participating states
The secondary market for RGGI allowances consists of trading the actual al-
lowances and its financial derivatives via standard futures, forwards and options
contracts. These transactions are either on a public exchange such as Chicago Cli-
mate Futures Exchange (CCFE) or over the counter (OTC) when they are not
traded on a public exchange but negotiated between two interested parties directly.
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4.3 Overview of RGGI Results
There have been sixteen auctions so far for the RGGI CO2 allowances. In Table 4.1,
we present the amount of allowances offered, percentage of offered allowances sold
along with the clearing and reserve prices for each auction.
Table 4.1: RGGI allowance auctions: Overview
Auction Control Allowances Clearing Reserve
period Offered % Sold price($) price($)
1 1 12,565,387 100.00 3.07 1.86
2 1 31,505,898 100.00 3.38 1.86
3 1 31,513,765 100.00 3.51 1.86
2 2,175,513 100.00 3.05 1.86
4 1 30,887,620 100.00 3.23 1.86
2 2,172,540 100.00 2.06 1.86
5 1 28,408,945 100.00 2.19 1.86
2 2,172,540 100.00 1.87 1.86
6 1 28,591,698 100.00 2.05 1.86
2 2,172,540 73.60 1.86 1.86
7 1 40,612,408 100.00 2.07 1.86
2 2,137,992 97.80 1.86 1.86
8 1 40,685,585 100.00 1.88 1.86
2 2,137,993 100.00 1.86 1.86
9 1 45,595,968 75.46 1.86 1.86
2 2,137,992 61.37 1.86 1.86
10 1 43,173,648 57.34 1.86 1.86
2 2,137,991 54.82 1.86 1.86
11 1 41,995,813 100.00 1.89 1.89
2 2,144,710 100.00 1.89 1.89
12 1 42,034,184 29.83 1.89 1.89
2 1,864,952 50.56 1.89 1.89
13 1 42,189,685 17.75 1.89 1.89
2 1,864,951 0.00 – 1.89
14 1 42,983,482 63.50 1.89 1.89
2 1,864,951 0.00 – 1.89
15 2 34,843,858 61.87 1.93 1.93
16 2 36,426,008 57.49 1.93 1.93
As seen from the table, the clearing price for both control periods has an over-
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all declining trend after an initial increase for the first three auctions. Auction 8
onwards the clearing price is the same as the reserve price for both control periods
clearly indicating excess supply of allowances relative to the demand. It is consis-
tent with the percentage amount of allowances sold out of total offered allowances
through the same period. While initial auctions show a hundred percent of offered
allowances being purchased, the later auctions exhibit much less enthusiasm on the
bidders part. Overall, in the first control period about 411 million allowances were
sold through auctions generating revenues for the participating states to the tune
of $952 million3.
The market monitor reports indicate a similar trend for the secondary market
prices during the first compliance period. The average CCFE futures contract price
decreased from about $5 in September 2008 to slightly above $3 in December 2009.
The decline in futures price continued though the next two years with little fluc-
tuation ending close to $2 in December 2011. RGGI defines compliance entities as
firms that own fossil fuel-fired electricity generating plants with 25MW or more of
capacity. They comprise of all the participating entities to RGGI and hold about 98
percent of the allowances by January 2012. The non-compliance entities compris-
ing mainly of banks and hedge funds acquired as much as 14 percent of allowances
over the first control period through auctions but held only 2 percent by the end
of January 2012 as they sold out most of their holdings on the secondary market.
Average daily volume of trading is an indicator of trading activity in the secondary
market. For CCFE listed futures contracts of RGGI, the average daily volume was
2.7 million in 2009. It fell drastically to 0.2 million in 2010 and further to 0.03
million in 2011 indicating a very sluggish secondary market for CO2 allowances.
3Market monitor report May, 2011.
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4.4 Relation to Theory
A cap and trade scheme like RGGI with explicitly defined primary and secondary
markets fits well into the framework of auctions with resale opportunities. The
CO2 allowances enter the primary market via auctions and traded on the secondary
market. Since the allowances have no expiration date, they can be thought of as
durable goods perfectly transferable between entities. The allowances completely
exit the market only when they are “turned in” to the regulatory authority by a
compliance entity to cover its emissions. Allowances that are retired in this way can
not reenter the market.
Among the two major groups of buyers of allowances, the non-compliance en-
tities can be thought of as having a ‘speculative’ motive4 behind their purchases.
Aside from a few environmental/cause oriented institutions, the majority of non-
compliance entities purchase the allowances in auctions with the sole purpose of
reselling. The compliance entities, on the other hand, buy allowances mainly to
cover their emissions. The course of auction clearing prices in the first control pe-
riod indicate the initial interest of ‘speculators’ resulting in higher prices in first 4
auctions. However, over the course of the first control period, we see the downward
trend of prices indicating a shift to buyer’s market in the resale stage. Note that
the majority of allowances are held by the compliance entities which can be taken
as a reflection of higher efficiency5. This scenario falls closer to our description
of monopsony resale regime in the previous chapters, wherein we would see lower
auction and resale prices coupled with higher efficiency.
Looking forward to the second control period, we expect a shift in bargaining
power as the prospect of a lowering cap can put an upward pressure on the allowance
4As described in Hafalir and Krishna (2008)
5In the sense of entities who value the item most end up possessing it. Unfortunately, we don’t
have access to firm level data to verify in a more precise manner.
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prices. Hence, we expect some activity from non-compliance entities during the




This study investigated the effects of bargaining power in a secondary market on
the bidding behavior in first price asymmetric auctions with resale using controlled
experiments. The data was collected via computer based experiments that incorpo-
rated the essentials of theoretical setup. The undergraduate and graduate students
from the University of Oklahoma, Norman participated in the experiments to pro-
vide data.
In the first essay, “Auctions with resale opportunities: An Experimental study”,
we compared the bidding behavior of bidders with asymmetric value supports be-
tween the auctions followed by monopoly resale (seller assumes all bargaining power)
and monopsony resale (buyer assumes all bargaining power). Two treatments using
different value support for the strong bidder were used. The experimental results
indicate higher bidding under the monopoly resale regime compared to the monop-
sony resale regime for both treatments. Resale prices, conditional on trade in the
second stage, are also higher under the monopoly resale regime. The observed ef-
ficiency levels are similar under both regimes. Using quantile regression analysis
and controlling for bidder specific and auction specific characteristics, we find some
evidence for bid symmetrization only under the monopsony resale regime.
The second essay, “Bargaining in Auctions with Resale”, extended the resale
stage setup to a double auction (DA) environment wherein the bargaining power is
equally divided between the buyer and seller. The treatments employed in this ex-
perimental setup were in line with those in the earlier essay to maintain consistency
in comparing the results. The bids and prices under the DA regime were found
closer to their monopsony counterparts. While strong bidders bid much higher than
predictions, weak bidders bid relatively closer to predictions leading to higher in-
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terim efficiencies and less number of trades in the resale stage. We compared the
bids by participant characteristics such as major of study, previous participation in
real life auctions, attitudes toward risk and gender to find no significant difference
in bidding.
Finally, we conclude the analysis by having a look at the emission trading
schemes (ETS) in the light of theoretical framework derived for auctions with re-
sale, with particular reference to the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI).
Recent trends in the allowance auction prices for RGGI indicate a transition from
monopoly resale regime to monopsony resale regime with low and stable auction
prices for the last few auctions. As the restrictions on total allowed emissions are
set to increase, we expect to see a revived interest by non-compliance entities in
purchasing allowances and thereby pushing up the allowance prices.
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Appendix A
A.1 Equilibrium Bid Distributions under
Monopsony Resale
Our setup is the same as in Hafalir and Krishna (2008). There are two risk neutral
bidders, bidding in an auction with the possibility of resale having no liquidity con-
straints. Bidder i’s private value is drawn from a regular distribution with virtual
valuation equal to xi − 1−Fi(x)fi(x) , that is increasing in x. Given this setup, resale
happens invariably from the weak to the strong bidder. The idea that converts
this two stage game into a single stage equivalent auction is the symmetrization
property. Due to the regularity condition and its uniquely defined resale structure,
the first price asymmetric auction with resale becomes a first-price symmetric auc-
tion, wherein bidders draw values from a common distribution (Hafalir and Krishna,
2008). This common distribution can be obtained from the bidders’ value distribu-
tions without any knowledge of the equilibrium bidding strategies. The equivalence
of the two auctions implies equivalence of bids and pricing strategies. Given Fs and
Fw, the value distributions for strong and weak bidder respectively, and assuming
that Fs(x) < Fw(x) for all x, the first price asymmetric auction with resale (FPAR)






φk(0) = 0 φk(b̄) = ak ∀k = s, w (A.1)









where F (.) is the common distribution derived from Fs and Fw defined over [0, p̄].
With p̄ as the upper bound of the price in the resale stage, we derive b̄, the highest
bid and then we can solve for bidding functions from the system of differential
equations in (2.4).
The problem under the monopsony regime can be tackled in a similar way. For
the purpose of exposition, we refer to weak bidder as “he” and strong bidder as
“she” in the following discussion. Note that the weak bidder does not have any
control over the resale price. He can only accept or reject the offer made by his
opponent. The strong bidder knows her own bid, her private value, and the upper
bound of the weak bidder’s value distribution. Recall that the weak bidder’s value
distribution is [0, aw] and aw < as, by assumption. Hence, it will be suboptimal to
offer anything above aw since all offers above this threshold are strictly dominated.
Therefore, the resale price will be drawn from an interval [0, aw], which is the same
as the weak bidder’s value distribution. Using the idea of equivalence, and given Fs
and Fw with Fs(x) < Fw(x) for all x, the first price asymmetric auction with resale






φk(0) = 0 φk(b̄) = ak ∀k = s, w (A.3)








with Fw(.) the common distribution over [0, aw].






∀k = s, w (A.5)
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subject to the following boundary conditions:





















∀k = s, w (A.6)



























Please answer the following questions while we calculate your payments for today’s
session. Please note that the answers to these questions have no relation to your
payments. The payments were determined by your performance in the rounds of
auctions you just played.
1. Please indicate your gender.
• M
• F






• BUSINESS & FINANCE
• LIFE SCIENCES
3. Please select if you are a graduate or an undergraduate student.
• GRADUATE
• UNDERGRADUATE




5. Have you participated in an auction experiment before?
• YES
• NO
6. Suppose you have to choose between the following three options:
A GETTING 10 RUCHMAS FOR SURE
B GETTING 20 RUCHMAS OR NO RUCHMAS BASED ON THE TOSS
OF A FAIR COIN
C I AM OKAY WITH EITHER A OR B
What will you choose?
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A.3 Instructions
This is an experiment regarding auctions. If you follow the instructions carefully,
you might earn money that will be credited to your sooner sense account. The par-
ticipation is purely voluntary. If you decide to participate, you will get 65 Ruchmas
(our experimental currency) that will serve as initial capital (or endowment) for you
in addition to what you earn during the experiment. Ruchmas will be converted
to Dollars at a rate of 13 Ruchmas = $1. The expected duration of experiment is
about 90 minutes. I am going to read out the instructions before we begin.
• You will act as a potential buyer bidding for 20 fictitious commodities sold in
successive rounds.
• At the beginning of the experiment, a random flip of a coin will determine
if you are going to be “Bidder type-U” or “Bidder type-P”. Please note that
your type will remain the SAME throughout the experiment.
• In each successive round, you will be matched with a different opponent who
is NOT your type. [for example, if you are Bidder type-U, your opponent will
always be a Bidder type-P and vice versa]
• Your opponent will change for each successive round but they will all be of
the same type (and that is different than your type).
• In each round, the value of the commodity for a bidder type-U will be a random
number up to two decimal places between 0.00 and 10.00 Ruchmas (that is,
any value between 0.00 and 10.00 is equally likely). FIGURE 1 describes the
likelihood of all possible values for bidder type-U. So your value is the result
of a spin of the arrow attached to this wheel for every round.
• Similarly, in each round, the value of the commodity for a bidder type-P will be
a random number up to two decimal places between 0.00 and 20.00 Ruchmas
(that is, any value between 0.00 and 20.00 is equally likely). FIGURE 2
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describes the likelihood of all possible values for bidder type-P. So your value
is the result of a spin of the arrow attached to this wheel for every round.
• To summarize, your type remains the same in today’s session (it is
either P or U) but your value may change in every round. Your
value for each round is determined by a spin of the arrow. Please
note that every spin is independent.
• You will be reminded of your type at the beginning of every new
round.
• Each round will have two stages: The Auction Stage and The Resale Stage.
Here is how a typical round will proceed:
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Figure 1: Value Distribution for BIDDER TYPE U
Figure 2: Value Distribution for BIDDER TYPE P
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Stage I-The Auction Stage:
In this stage, every player will submit a bid for a fictitious commodity being sold
at an auction.
• You will receive the information about your value only.
• After finding out your value for the commodity, you will begin by choosing
a number or a “bid”. Please think carefully before you make your choice.
You may use a calculator by clicking on the icon that will appear to the right
hand side of your screen. You will have 45 seconds to make a decision. Your
Opponent will also choose a bid at the same time. Neither player can see his
opponent’s value or bid.
• The person with the high bid will win the commodity being sold and pay his
own bid as the price. In the case of a tie, a random coin flip will decide the
winner.
• You will be informed whether you won the auction or not.
• The following schematic describes the auction stage and the interim payoff
calculations.
• Note that this is just the interim payoff. The final payoff of a round will be
determined at the end of stage II- the Resale Stage. It will begin immediately
after the auction stage.
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Figure 3: Interim Payoff Calculations
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Stage II-The Resale Stage (Owner Makes An Offer):
In this stage, the bidder who won the first stage will have the opportunity to
resell the commodity to his opponent. It works in the following way:
• The winning bidder can choose to make a ‘take-it-or-leave-it’ offer to the
opponent.
• If the winning bidder does not want to make an offer, he may quote a price of
9999 Ruchmas.
• If the offer is made and accepted, trade takes place and the owner will receive
the difference between the offer and his first stage bid. The opponent will
receive the difference between his value and the offer.
• If the offer is rejected (or is 9999) there will be NO trade in the second stage.
So, the first stage winner will keep the commodity and receive the difference
between his value and the first stage bid. The opponent will receive nothing
for that round.
• The following schematic describes the course of the second stage where the
owner makes an offer:
• This will conclude a typical round and a new round will begin with Stage I as
described earlier.
• The total earnings for a player will be equal to the SUM of all final payoffs
from each round. The dollar amount to be credited on your sooner sense
account will be calculated on the basis of the conversion rate mentioned earlier.
• Are there any questions at this stage? Please feel free to ask before we begin.
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Figure 4: Resale Stage Payoff
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• The following graphical example will show how a typical round will proceed:
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Stage II-The Resale Stage (Owner Receives An Offer):
In this stage, the bidder who did not win the first stage will have the
opportunity to buy the commodity from his opponent. It works in the following
way:
• The bidder not winning the first stage can choose to make a ‘take-it-or-leave-
it’ offer to the opponent.
• If he does not want to make an offer, he may quote a price of 0 (Zero) Ruchmas.
• If the offer is made and accepted, trade takes place and the owner will receive
the difference between the offer and his first stage bid. The opponent will
receive the difference between his value and the offer.
• If the offer is rejected (or is 0) there will be NO trade in the second stage.
So, the first stage winner will keep the commodity and receive the difference
between his value and the first stage bid. The opponent will receive nothing
for that round.
• The following schematic describes the course of the second stage where the
owner makes an offer:
• This will conclude a typical round and a new round will begin with Stage I as
described earlier.
• The total earnings for a player will be equal to the SUM of all final payoffs
from each round. The dollar amount to be credited on your sooner sense
account will be calculated on the basis of the conversion rate mentioned earlier.
• Are there any questions at this stage? Please feel free to ask before we begin.
87
Figure 5: Resale Stage Payoff
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• The following graphical example will show how a typical round will proceed:
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A.4 zTree: Screen-shots and code
Next, we present the screen-shots from z-Tree to give an idea of how the experiment
appeared to the players. Final three figures present screen-shots of z-Tree code used
to create the experiment.
Figure A.1: Opening Screen for Bidders declaring player type
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Figure A.2: Bidding Screen for Auction Stage
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Figure A.3: Auction Stage Winner: Monopoly Resale
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Figure A.4: Auction Stage Loser: Monopoly Resale
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Figure A.5: Auction Stage Winner: Monopsony Resale
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Figure A.6: Auction Stage Loser: Monopsony Resale
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Figure A.7: Second Stage Offer: Monopoly Resale
96
Figure A.8: Second Stage Offer: Monopsony Resale
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Figure A.9: Final Payoff Screen
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Figure A.10: Code - 1
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Figure A.11: Code - 2
100
Figure A.12: Code - 3
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Appendix B
B.1 Derivation of Equilibrium Bidding Strategies
Following Cheng and Tan (2008), the resale game has the double auction format
preceded by a first price auction under this setup. The value distributions are
uniform and asymmetric with







where aw and as are the upper bounds for weak and strong bidders’ value distribu-
tions respectively and aw ≤ as. The pricing functions for the seller and the buyer
in the resale game can be described as follows:
ps(vw) = c1vw + d1 pb(vs) = c2vs + d2 (B.1)
where c1, c2, d1, d2 are constants. A weak bidder (seller) with value vw chooses


















































Solving (B.2) and (B.3) using (B.1), we find the following equilibrium pricing func-































Using these prices in the differential equations system that solves for the inverse




















∀k = s, w (B.4)
subject to the following boundary conditions:
φk(0) = 0, φk
[








∀k = s, w.















∀k = s, w (B.5)
subject to the following boundary conditions:
φk
[















= ak ∀k = s, w.
B.2 Questionnaire
Please answer the following questions while we calculate your payments for today’s
session. Please note that the answers to these questions have no relation to your
payments. The payments were determined by your performance in the rounds of
auctions you just played.
1. Please indicate your gender.
• M
• F





• BUSINESS & FINANCE
• LIFE SCIENCES
3. Please select if you are a graduate or an undergraduate student.
• GRADUATE
• UNDERGRADUATE








6. Have you participated in an auction experiment before?
• YES
• NO
7. Suppose you have to choose between the following three options:
A GETTING 10 RUCHMAS FOR SURE
B GETTING 20 RUCHMAS OR NO RUCHMAS BASED ON THE TOSS
OF A FAIR COIN
C I AM OKAY WITH EITHER A OR B
What will you choose?
105
B.3 Instructions
This is an experiment regarding auctions. If you follow the instructions carefully,
you might earn money that will be credited to your sooner sense account. The par-
ticipation is purely voluntary. If you decide to participate, you will get 100 Ruchmas
(our experimental currency) that will serve as initial capital (or endowment) for you
in addition to what you earn during the experiment. Ruchmas will be converted
to Dollars at a rate of 7 Ruchmas = $1. The expected duration of experiment is
about 90 minutes. I am going to read out the instructions before we begin.
• You will act as a potential buyer bidding for 40 fictitious commodities sold in
successive rounds.
• At the beginning of the experiment, a random flip of a coin will determine
if you are going to be “Bidder type-U” or “Bidder type-P”. Please note that
your type will remain the SAME for the first 20 rounds of the experiment.
• Your type will change for the next 20 rounds and will remain SAME for the
rest of the session. There will be two practice rounds in the beginning to make
you familiar with the setup.
• In each successive round, you will be matched with a different opponent who
is NOT your type. [for example, if you are Bidder type-U, your opponent will
always be a Bidder type-P and vice versa]
• Your opponent will change for each successive round but they will all be of
the same type (and that is different than your type).
• In each round, the value of the commodity for a bidder type-U will be a random
number up to two decimal places between 0.00 and 10.00 Ruchmas (that is,
any value between 0.00 and 10.00 is equally likely). FIGURE 1 describes the
likelihood of all possible values for bidder type-U. So your value is the result
of a spin of the arrow attached to this wheel for every round.
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• Similarly, in each round, the value of the commodity for a bidder type-P will be
a random number up to two decimal places between 0.00 and 20.00 Ruchmas
(that is, any value between 0.00 and 20.00 is equally likely). FIGURE 2
describes the likelihood of all possible values for bidder type-P. So your value
is the result of a spin of the arrow attached to this wheel for every round.
• Each round will have two stages: The Auction Stage and The Resale Stage.
Here is how a typical round will proceed:
• To summarize, your type will change only once in today’s session (it
is either P or U) but your value may change in every round. Your
value for each round is determined by a spin of the arrow. Please
note that every spin is independent.
• You will be reminded of your type at the beginning of every new
round.
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Figure 1: Value Distribution for BIDDER TYPE U
Figure 2: Value Distribution for BIDDER TYPE P
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Stage I-The Auction Stage:
In this stage, every player will submit a bid for a fictitious commodity being sold
at an auction.
• You will receive the information about your value only.
• After finding out your value for the commodity, you will begin by choosing
a number or a “bid”. Please think carefully before you make your choice.
You may use a calculator by clicking on the icon that will appear to the right
hand side of your screen. You will have 45 seconds to make a decision. Your
Opponent will also choose a bid at the same time. Neither player can see his
opponent’s value or bid.
• The person with the high bid will win the commodity being sold and pay his
own bid as the price. In the case of a tie, a random coin flip will decide the
winner.
• You will be informed whether you won the auction or not.
• The following schematic describes the auction stage and the interim payoff
calculations.
• Note that this is just the interim payoff. The final payoff of a round will be
determined at the end of stage II - the Resale Stage. It will begin immediately
after the auction stage.
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Figure 3: Interim Payoff Calculation
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Stage II-The Resale Stage:
In this stage, the bidders will have one more opportunity to resell/buy the
commodity to/from his opponent. It works in the following way:
• Both bidders can choose to make an offer to the opponent.
• If the winning bidder does not want to make an offer, he may quote a price of
21 Ruchmas.
• If the opponent does not want to make an offer, he may quote a price of 0
Ruchmas.
• If the offers are made and buyers offer is at least as high as the sellers offer,
trade takes place.
• If trade takes place, the resale price is halfway between the buyers offer and
the sellers offer. The seller will receive the difference between the resale price
and his initial bid. The opponent will receive the difference between his value
and the resale price.
• If the buyers offer is less than the sellers offer (or is 0), there will be NO trade
in the second stage. So, the first stage winner will keep the commodity and
receive the difference between his value and the first stage bid. The opponent
will receive nothing for that round.
• The following schematic describes the course of the second stage:
• This will conclude a typical round and a new round will begin with Stage I as
described earlier.
• The total earnings for a player will be equal to the SUM of all final payoffs
from each round. The dollar amount to be credited on your sooner sense
account will be calculated on the basis of the conversion rate mentioned earlier.
• Are there any questions at this stage? Please feel free to ask before we begin.
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Figure 4: Resale Stage Payoff
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• The following graphical example will show how a typical round will proceed:
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B.4 zTree: Screen-shots and code
Next, we present the screen-shots from z-Tree to give an idea of how the experiment
appeared to the players. Final four figures present screen-shots of z-Tree code used
to create the experiment.
Figure B.1: Opening Screen for Bidders declaring player type
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Figure B.2: Bidding Screen for Auction Stage
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Figure B.3: Auction Stage Winner
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Figure B.4: Auction Stage Loser
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Figure B.5: Final Payoff Screen when resale takes place.
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Figure B.6: Final Payoff Screen when resale does not take place.
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Figure B.7: Code - 1
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Figure B.8: Code - 2
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Figure B.9: Code - 3
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Figure B.10: Code - 4
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